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1. Introduction
Common sense might suggest that if two identical rational economic agents who are
attempting to maximize the same objective function have the same data or informa-
tion set at their disposal, they will make the same choice. Perhaps for this reason
it is hardly ever asked whether the process through which this data was generated
matters or is it suﬃcient to merely know the stock of information the agents have
in their possession at the time the choice is made. This question is clearly impor-
tant for many economic situations. For example, think of an environment where a
task is repeatedly performed and the expertise of the decision maker increases as a
function of the cumulative stock of output produced as in a learning-by-doing envi-
ronment. In such an environment, does the stock of observations generated along the
way summarize all the information needed to make eﬃcient economic decisions or
is the actual experience that led to these observations important? In this paper we
present experimental evidence that addresses this question.
One can envision learning in distinctly diﬀerent ways. Observational learning,
would have a decision maker (the observer) simply looking over the shoulder of another
decision maker (the doer) as he performs his learning-by-doing task (see Jovanovic
and Nyarko (1996) for an application of an apprentice-craftsman model similar, in
spirit, to the one we explore here). Here the observer simply keeps his eyes open but
his hands in his pocket. Still after enough repetition both the observer and the doer
would have the same observations and if they are rational and out to maximize the
same objective function, we might actually expect the doer to perform no worse than
the observer since he or she has had additional hands-on experience.
A large number of animal studies support the hypothesis that observational learn-
ing can be eﬃcient. For example, Terkel (1996) shows that young rats seem to learn
how to skin pine cones quite easily by observing their mothers when they are young.
John, et al, (1969) demonstrates that cats can be trained to perform tasks by be-
ing placed in a cage divided down the middle with a glass wall through which they
can observe an animal already trained in a particular task perform. After a certain
amount of observation, the cat seems perfectly able to perform the task despite theLearning By Not Doing 2
fact that it has never done it.
In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that the process through which infor-
mation is gathered can aﬀect the choices of experimental subjects drawn at random
from identical populations. What we ﬁnd is that subjects can sometimes learn better
by not doing but by watching. A possible explanation is that when subjects perform
an experiment or participate in a market repeatedly and earn a small payoﬀ each pe-
riod, as is true for most markets, the feedback of the market tends to focus attention of
the decision makers on the myopic stimulus-response aspect of the problem and seems
to prevent them from learning the trade-oﬀs existing in the experiment (see Merlo
and Schotter (1999), henceforth M-S, for a fuller exposition of this point). However,
when such behavior is merely observed, attention is again re-focused and performance
is enhanced. To some extent, this explains the value of coaches, theatrical directors,
Sunday morning quarterbacks, and kibitzers in general.
Another ﬁnding which we consider of interest is the fact that not only is obser-
vation potentially performance improving, but how much better an observer does
depends crucially on who they observe. Put diﬀerently, those observers watching do-
ers who did relatively well made far better decisions than those who watched relatively
poor doers. Good role models are crucial to good performance.
In the remainder of this paper we proceed as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the
decision task that our subjects performed and our experimental design. In Sections
3 and 4 we present the results of our experiment. Finally, in Section 5 we oﬀer some
conclusions.
2. The Decision Task and the Experimental Design
As was true in M-S, all of the experiments performed to investigate our hypotheses
were of the tournament variety and similar to those of Bull Schotter and Weigelt
(1987) and Schotter and Weigelt (1992). In those experiments, randomly paired sub-
jects must, in each round, choose a number, e, between 0 and 100 called their decision
number. After this number is chosen, a random number is independently generated
by each subject from a uniform distribution over the closed interval [−a,+a]. TheseLearning By Not Doing 3
numbers, each player’s decision number and random number are then added together
and a “total number” deﬁned for each subject. Payoﬀs are determined by comparing
the total numbers of the subjects in each pair and awarding that subject with the
largest total number a “big”payment of M and that subject with the smallest total
number a “small” payments m, M > m. The cost of the decision number chosen,
given by a convex function c(e) = e2/k, is then subtracted from these ﬁxed payment
to determine a subject’s ﬁnal payoﬀ. Hence, in these experiments there is a trade-
oﬀ in the choice of decision numbers: higher numbers generate higher probabilities
of winning the big prize but also imply higher decision costs.1 By letting k = 500,
a = 40, M = 29, and m = 17.2, the two person tournament has a unique Nash equi-
librium at 37. By replacing one player with a computerized automaton programmed
to always choose 37, and informing the live subject of that fact, we transform the
problem for the remaining live player into a one-person maximization problem with
a quadratic payoﬀ function. The objective function in this problem is the conditional
payoﬀ function obtained from our two-person tournament game after restricting the
automaton’s choice to equal 37.
We consider the experimental task to be a good one for our purposes for at least
two reasons. First, although it presents subjects with a complete information max-
imization problem for which the optimal action could be calculated a priori, such
a problem is suﬃciently complex so that a deductive solution should be out of the
grasp of most experimental subjects. Second, in spite of the complexity of the deci-
sion problem, the experiment is simple to describe and to understand. This feature
is appealing since it should reduce the noise in the data.
As in the M-S experiments, subjects in our experiment repeated the decision task
described above 75 times and were paid a small amount after each trial. When
they were ﬁnished, they were surprised to ﬁnd out that they were going to do the
experiment one more time for “big stakes”, i.e. amounts that were 75 times the
period-to-period payoﬀs they earned in the previous 75 rounds. The choice they
1In the instructions, a sample of which is contained in the Appendix, we take great care not to
use value ladened terms such as “winning” or “losing”.Learning By Not Doing 4
make in this “surprise-quiz” round should be a snap shot (suﬃcient statistic) of
exactly what they learned during the previous 75 rounds. Presumably, the choice
they make here should be their best guess as to what is the optimal choice. M-S
focus their attention on comparisons of the surprise-quiz rounds in experiments with
diﬀerent payoﬀ environments.
The diﬀerence between our experiments here and those of M-S is that in the exper-
iments we report on here as each subject performed the experiment another subject
watched quietly over his or her shoulder. Strict silence was rigorously enforced (al-
though no instance of talking occurred) and subjects were forbidden to communicate
in any manner either by groaning, sighing, laughing, raising an eye-brow or in any
other manner. These subjects who watched without doing the experiment (the ob-
servers) were not told what they would do after the subjects they were watching (the
doers) were ﬁnished, but were told that what they were observing was relevant to the
experiment they would ultimately do. They left the room before the surprise-quiz
was announced to the doers. When they returned, the doers were gone, having per-
formed a surprise-quiz round, and they were told that all they needed to do in the
experiment was to play the same game they just watched being played once and only
once for big stakes, i.e. amounts that were 75 times larger than the individual round
payoﬀs of the experiments they watched.
Note that in the experiment we performed, the information of each pair of subjects
(a doer and an observer) was identical, since each observer was watching over the
shoulder of a doer. We simply manipulated the manner in which the information was
obtained with the doer actually generating it and the observer passively watching it
being generated. What we compare in our analysis are the surprise-quiz choices of
these two groups of subjects. As we said before, if these subjects learned diﬀerently
or learned diﬀerent things, this diﬀerential learning should be detectable in their
surprise-quiz choices.Learning By Not Doing 5
2.1. Procedures
All of the experiments reported here were run in the experimental economics lab-
oratory of the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University.
Students were recruited and brought into a room in groups ranging in size from 10 to
20. There were a total of 62 subjects. When they arrived they were randomly divided
into two types called A and B with the A types being the doers and the B types be-
ing the observers. The instructions were handed out to all subjects. Observers were
told that after the subjects they were watching were done they would partake in an
experiment themselves, but they were not told the nature of the experiment. All they
were told was that the experiment would, in some way, be related to the one they
observed. Subjects who were actually doing the experiment completed 75 rounds and
before they chose in the surprise-quiz, the observers were asked to leave the room so
that they could not see what decision was ultimately made in the big stakes round.
Observers were subsequently brought back in and asked to make one and only once
choice for big stakes. All payoﬀs in the experiment were denominated in an experi-
mental currency called francs which was converted into dollars at the rate of 0.01:1.
In the surprise-quiz rounds the conversion rate was 0.75:1.
Subjects who performed the experiment as doers earned approximately $30 for the
one and one half hours they spent in the lab, since they in essence did the experiment
twice. All other subjects earned half that amount.
2.2. Research Questions
While no theory exists upon which to base predictions for these experiments, the
previous experiments of M-S do help in establishing a basis upon which a series of
questions can be formulated. In M-S the authors discovered that subject choices in
the surprise-quiz portion of the experiment were not particularly good in the sense
that their choices were not close to the optimal choice of 37. They conjectured that
this was true because in the environment in which they were searching, where they
received small payoﬀs after each round, the object of learning shifted from discovering
the peak of the payoﬀ function they faced to discovering the appropriate manner inLearning By Not Doing 6
which to respond to the period-by-period feedback they received from the experiment.
Hence subjects processed the data they generated in a particular fashion and when
they were surprised at the end of the experiment by a surprise-quiz, they realized
that they have failed to provide themselves with a good cognitive map of the payoﬀ
function they faced. If this conjecture were true, and if the presence of an observer did
not inﬂuence subject behavior, then we would expect subjects functioning as doers
in our experiment to perform in a similar fashion as the subjects in M-S and fail to
learn the optimal decision.
The focus of this paper is to investigate the performance of the observers relative
to the doers. We do this by using the data generated by our subjects in their surprise-
quiz rounds and asking the following four questions.
Question 1: Are the median surprise-quiz choices of both the doer and observer
subjects equal to 37?
Question 2: Subject-pair by subject-pair, how do the surprise-quiz payoﬀs of ob-
servers compare to those of doers?
Question 3: Are the distributions of observer and doer surprise-quiz choices diﬀer-
ent?
Question 4: Within subject-pairs, are the surprise-quiz choices of doers and ob-
servers highly correlated?
3. Results
The discussion of the results of our experiments is presented in terms of the questions
we proposed to answer. We begin by presenting some simple descriptive statistics of
the choices doer and observer subjects made in their surprise-quiz rounds.
Table 1 presents the surprise-quiz choices of our doers and observers as well as
their expected payoﬀs given the choices that they made and the distribution of random
shocks assumed in the experiment.
[TABLE 1 HERE]Learning By Not Doing 7
Several features of the data are salient.
1) While the median choice of the observers was 37 (the optimal choice), the me-
dian choice of the doers was 50. (The means were 40.64 and 51.06, respectively).
2) The mean and median choices of doers (51 and 50, respectively) were the same
as the mean and median choices of subjects in M-S. This result both replicates
our previous result and indicates that the presence of an observer did not alter
the behavior of doers.
3) While there were 12 observers whose surprise-quiz choice deviated from the
optimal choice of 37 by ﬁve or less, there were only ﬁve such deviations for the
doers. Moreover, while six subjects in the observer sample chose 37 exactly,
only one subjects in the doer sample did.
4) Although the observers had a higher mean and median payoﬀ than did the do-
ers, because the payoﬀ function was relatively ﬂat around the optimum, these
diﬀerence do not seem very dramatic. Still, in 22 out of the 31 pairs the ob-
server made a choice which was weakly payoﬀ increasing, or at least not payoﬀ
decreasing, when compared to the doers.
5) For the doers, in the surprise-quiz round, 10 out of the 31 subjects made dom-
inated choices (choices over 65) while for the observers there were only 5 such
choices.
6) The correlation of doer and observer choices, conditional on observing the same
information, was only 0.39 indicating that despite their shared history, the
observer and doer subjects processed the information they experienced quite
diﬀerently.
To summarize, there was a deﬁnite diﬀerence in the surprise-quiz choices of doers
and observers.
The results in Table 1 are summarized by the histograms presented in Figures
1 and 2 where we plot the choices made in the surprise-quiz rounds by doers andLearning By Not Doing 8
observers (Figure 1) and the absolute deviations from the optimal choice of 37 in
each condition (Figure 2).
[FIGURES 1 & 2 HERE]
We now turn our attention to answering the four questions posed above.
Question 1: Are the median surprise-quiz choices of both the doer and
observer subjects equal to 37?
To answer this question we perform a simple Binomial test individually on the
sample of doer and observer surprise-quiz choices testing that the probability that
observations are above 37 equals the probability that observations are below 37. What
we ﬁnd is that while we can obviously not reject the hypothesis that the median of
the observer choices was equal to 37 (remember the actual median was in fact 37),
we can reject the hypothesis that the median of the doer choices (which was 50) was
equal to 37 using a normal approximation (p-value 0.007).
Question 2: Subject-pair by subject-pair, how do the surprise-quiz pay-
oﬀs of observers compare to those of doers?
To answer this question we use a sign test of the following type. Take any doer
subject in the experiment and his or her associated observer. Then take the surprise-
quiz choice of the doer and compare it to the surprise-quiz choice of the observer.
Score the choice of the observer with a plus if it leads to a payoﬀ improvement over
that of the doer. If it leads to a decrease in the subject’s payoﬀ score it as a minus
and if the subjects choose the same decision number score it as a zero and drop that
observation. We then test the hypothesis that the median diﬀerence between these
two groups is zero, which would imply that the probability of getting a payoﬀ increase
for observers would be exactly equal to the probability of a payoﬀ decrease. In other
words, we would expect this “increase probability”, π, to equal 1/2. Under the null
that π = 1/2, we calculate the probability of observing at least 19 pluses out of 28.
What we ﬁnd is that, using a normal approximation, we can reject the hypothesis ofLearning By Not Doing 9
equality of payoﬀs in favor of the one-tailed alternative that the choices made by our
observers were payoﬀ increasing (p-value 0.019).
Question 3: Are the distributions of observer and doer surprise-quiz
choices diﬀerent?
To answer this question we perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test using the data
contained in Table 1. Here, in spite of the diﬀerences between the distributions of doer
and observer choices observed in Figures 1 and 2, we can not reject the hypothesis
that these distributions are not diﬀerent (p-value 0.079).
Question 4: Within subject-pairs, are the surprise-quiz choices of doers
and observers highly correlated?
The correlation between doer and observer choices is 0.39. We test the hypothesis
that this coeﬃcient is equal to one, which would indicate perfect correlation between
the choices of doers and observers.Using a normality approximation, the test statistic
is distributed as a t-statistic with 29 degrees of freedom. What we ﬁnd is that we
can reject the hypothesis that the surprise-quiz choices of doers and observers are
perfectly correlated (p-value 0.005). This implies that despite the fact that doers and
seers observed identical data before their surprise-quiz rounds, their behavior diﬀered
substantially.
4. Do Good Craftspeople Make Good Apprentices?
What we have demonstrated so far is that in general and on average, observers do
better that doers in the decision task we have confronted them with. However, we ﬁnd
an equally interesting result when we disaggregate our data slightly in the following
manner. Look at the doers in our experiment and deﬁne those doers who received a
payoﬀ that was better than the median during their ﬁrst 75 rounds in the experiment
as “better doers”. Deﬁne those who did worse than the median as “worse doers”.
Now consider those observers who watched the better doers and those that watched
the worse doers and look at their decisions in the surprise-quiz round. When we
do this we ﬁnd that those observers who watched the better doers did signiﬁcantly
better than those who watched the worse doers. More precisely, if one calculates theLearning By Not Doing 10
median absolute diﬀerence between the surprise-quiz choices made by those subjects
who watched the better doers and the optimal decision of 37, one ﬁnds that this
diﬀerence is 3 (the mean diﬀerence is 9.125). In other words, half of the 16 subjects
who watched better doers made surprise-quiz choices that were less than three units
away from 37. For the observers who watched worse doers, the median absolute
diﬀerence is 27 (mean 27.7). This is, we believe, a dramatic diﬀerence. In addition,
of the ﬁve observers who, in the surprise-quiz round, chose exactly 37, all ﬁve were
in the subset who watched better doers.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that the improvement of decisions of subjects observ-
ing better doers over the people they watched was relatively better than their cohorts
observing worse doers. For example, while the better (worse) doers had a median
absolute deviation from 37 of 13.5 (32) the subjects that observed them made choices
that had a median deviation from 37 of only 3 (27). Hence, the observers of the better
doers had a greater percentage improvement in their performance over those whom
they observed (from 13.5 to 3, an 80.7% improvement in the median) than did the
observers of worse doers whose median deviation from 37 only improved from 32 to
27 (a 15.67% improvement).
The point seems clear. While watching can improve performance, watching some-
one good improves it even more. It appears that people have a relatively easier time
of learning from example than from object lesson. Put diﬀerently, if one is going to
watch a craftsman work and learn at his shoulder, they would be better oﬀ watching
a good one and learning from his skill than watching a bad one and learning from his
mistakes.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to make one simple point. The process through
which information is accumulated may have a signiﬁcant impact on the quality of
economic decisions made by decision makers. Moreover, observational learning can
outperform learning-by-doing. We believe these results are puzzling and provocative
and pose some new challenges for economic theory.Learning By Not Doing 11
Appendix
A.1. Instructions
This is an experiment on decision making. Funds have been provided for this experiment by a
number of research institutes and foundations and if you pay attention and make good decisions,
you may earn a good amount of money which we will arrange to pay you after the experiment is
over.
As you walk into the room you will randomly divided into two equal sized groups, Group A and
Group B. If the upper right hand corner of this instruction sheet has an A on it your will be in the
A Group, if it has a B, you will be in the B Group. The experiment will then proceed as follows:
Both groups will read the attached instructions which are identical for all people. After you have
ﬁnished reading the instructions we will read them out loud and answer any question you might
have about them. When this instructional period is over we will proceed to the computer lab where
the people in the A Group will sit in front of a terminal and perform the experiment described in
the instructions for 75 rounds, i.e., they will repeat the same experiment 75 time. Each person in
the B Group will be matched up with one person in the an A Group and while that person performs
the experiment he/she will silently watch by looking over his/her shoulder.
As the B Group people watch there must be no communication between the A
Group person and his pair member. This means, no talking, shared looks, groans,
giggles, or reactions of any type. Just silence.
When the 75 rounds are over, the B Group people will leave the computer lab and another
experiment will be described to them which they will perform. This experiment is closely related
to the one the A Group people just did, so it is important that you pay attention to what your
cohorts do. The A Group people will stay in the lab where they will receive further instructions, be
paid, and leave. The B Group will then return to the lab when the A Group is gone, perform their
experiment, be paid and leave.
A.1.1. Speciﬁc Instructions
As you read these instructions you will be in a room with a number of other subjects. Each subject
has been randomly assigned an ID number and a computer terminal. The experiment consists of 75
decision rounds. In each decision round you will be paired with a computerized subject which has
been programmed to make the same decision in every round. The computerized subject randomly
matched with you will be called your pair member. Your computerized pair member will remain the
same throughout the entire experiment.Learning By Not Doing 12
A.1.2. Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you will perform a simple task. Attached to these instructions is a sheet called
your “Decision Cost Table”. This sheet shows 101 numbers from 0 to 100 in column A. These are
your decision numbers. Associated with each decision number is a decision cost, which is listed in
column B. Note that the higher the decision number chosen, the greater is the associated cost. Your
computer screen should look as follows as you entered the lab:
PLAYER#
ROUND DECISION# RANDOM# TOTAL# COST EARNINGS
In each decision round the computer will ask you to choose a decision number. Your computer-
ized pair member will also choose a decision number. Remember that it will always choose the same
decision number, which will be 37 in each decision round. You, of course, are free to choose any
number you wish among those listed in column A of your “Decision Cost Table.” Therefore, in each
round of the experiment, you and your computerized pair member will each select a decision number
separately (and you know that it will always choose 37). Using the number keys, you will enter your
selected number and then hit the Return (Enter) key. To verify your selection, the computer will
then ask you the following question:
IS YOUR DECISION NUMBER? [Y/N]
If the number shown is the one you desire, hit the Y key. If not, hit the N key and the computer
will ask you to select a number again. After you have selected and veriﬁed your number, this number
will be recorded on the screen in column 2, and its associated cost will be recorded in column 5. After
you have selected your decision number, the computer will ask you to generate a random number.
You do this by hitting the space bar (the long key at the bottom of the keyboard). Hitting the bar
causes the computer to select one of the 81 numbers that fall between -40 and +40 (including 0).
Each of these 81 numbers has an equally likely chance of being chosen when you hit the space bar.
Hence, the probability that the computer selects, say, +40 is the same as the probability that it selects
-40, 0, -12 or +27. Another random number (again between -40 and + 40) will be automatically
generated for your computerized pair member as well. The processes that generate your random
number and the random number assigned to your computerized pair member are independent–i.e.,
you should not expect any relationship between the two random numbers generated to exist. After
you hit the space bar, the computer will record your random number on the screen in column 3.
A.1.3. Calculation of Payoﬀs
Your payment in each decision round will be computed as follows. After you select a decision number
and generate a random number, the computer will add these two numbers and record the sum on
the screen in column 4. We will call the number in column 4 your “Total Number”. The computerLearning By Not Doing 13
will do the same computation for your computerized pair member as well. The computer will then
compare your Total Number to that of your computerized pair member. If your Total Number is
greater than your computerized pair member’s Total Number, then you will receive the high ﬁxed
payment of 29 Fr., in a ﬁctitious currency called Francs. If not, then you will receive the low ﬁxed
payment 17.2 Fr. Whether you receive the ﬁxed payment 29 Fr. or the ﬁxed payment 17.2 Fr. only
depends on whether your Total Number is greater than your computerized pair member’s Total
Number. It does not depend on how much bigger it is. The Francs will be converted into dollars at
the conversion rate to be stated below. The computer will record (on the screen in column 6) which
ﬁxed payment you receive. If you receive the high ﬁxed payment (29 Fr.), then “M” will appear in
column 6. If you receive the low ﬁxed payment (17.2 Fr.), “m” will appear. After indicating which
ﬁxed payment you receive, the computer will subtract your associated decision cost (column 5) from
this ﬁxed payment. This diﬀerence represents your earnings for the round. The amount of your
earnings will be recorded on the screen in column 6, right next to the letter (“M” or “m”) showing
your ﬁxed payment.
A.1.4. Continuing Rounds
After round 1 is over, you will perform the same procedure for round 2, and so on for 75 rounds.
In each round you will choose a decision number and generate a random number by pressing the
space bar. Your Total Number will be compared to the Total Number of your computerized pair
member, and the computer will calculate your earnings for the round. When round 75 is completed,
the computer will ask you to press any key on its keyboard. After you do this, the computer will
add your Francs earnings from each of the 75 rounds and convert this sum in Dollars at the rate of
$0.01 per Franc. We will then pay you this amount.
A.1.5. Example of Payoﬀ Calculations
Suppose that the following occurs during one round: pair member A2 chooses a decision number of 60
and generates a random number of 10, while computerized pair member A, selects a decision number
of 37 and gets a random number of 5. Pair member A2 would then receive the high ﬁxed payment
of 29 Fr. From this ﬁxed payment, A2 would subtract 7.2 Fr.(the cost of decision number 60). A2’s
earnings for that round would then be 21.8 Fr. (i.e., 29 Fr. – 7.2 Fr.). Note that the decision
cost subtracted in column 5 is a function only of your decision number; i.e., your random number
does not aﬀect the amount subtracted. Also, note that your earnings depend on the following:
the decision number you select (both because it contributes to your Total Number and because it
determines the amount–i.e., your Decision Cost–to be subtracted from your ﬁxed payment), your
computerized pair member’s pre-selected decision number (37), your generated random number, and
your computerized pair member’s generated random number.Learning By Not Doing 14
Decision Cost Table
A B A B A B A B
Cost of Cost of Cost of Cost of
Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision
Number (Francs) Number (Francs) Number (Francs) Number (Francs)
0 0.00 26 1.35 52 5.41 78 12.17
1 0.00 27 1.46 53 5.62 79 12.48
2 0.01 28 1.57 54 5.83 80 12.80
3 0.02 29 1.68 55 6.05 81 13.12
4 0.03 30 1.80 56 6.27 82 13.45
5 0.05 31 1.92 57 6.50 83 13.78
6 0.07 32 2.05 58 6.73 84 14.11
7 0.10 33 2.18 59 6.96 85 14.45
8 0.13 34 2.31 60 7.20 86 14.79
9 0.16 35 2.45 61 7.44 87 15.14
10 0.20 36 2.50 62 7.69 88 15.49
11 0.24 37 2.74 63 7.94 89 15.84
12 0.29 38 2.89 64 8.19 90 16.20
13 0.34 39 3.04 65 8.45 91 16.56
14 0.39 40 3.20 66 8.71 92 16.93
15 0.45 41 3.36 67 8.98 93 17.30
16 0.51 42 3.53 68 9.25 94 17.67
17 0.58 43 3.70 69 9.52 95 18.05
18 0.65 44 3.87 70 9.80 96 18.43
19 0.72 45 4.06 71 10.08 97 18.82
20 0.80 46 4.23 72 10.37 98 19.21
21 0.88 47 4.42 73 10.66 99 19.60
22 0.97 48 4.61 74 10.95 100 20.00
23 1.06 49 4.80 75 11.25
24 1.15 50 5.00 76 11.55
25 1.25 51 5.20 77 11.86Learning By Not Doing 15
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Table 1: Surprise-Quiz Results
Surprise-Quiz Choices Expected Payoﬀs
Subject-Pair Doer Observer Doer Observer
1 50 40 20.14 20.34
2 45 40 20.26 20.34
3 78 76 18.40 18.59
4 41 57 20.32 19.86
5 38 37 20.35 20.35
6 69 97 19.15 16.25
7 69 0 19.15 18.94
8 57 43 19.86 20.35
9 36 1 20.35 19.01
10 100 37 15.84 20.35
11 29 35 20.35 20.35
12 100 20 15.84 20.08
13 20 37 20.08 20.35
14 29 40 20.30 20.34
15 60 37 19.72 20.35
16 30 30 20.32 20.32
17 25 30 20.22 20.32
18 37 54 20.35 19.99
19 88 88 17.37 17.37
20 55 68 19.95 19.22
21 52 20 20.07 20.08
22 98 77 16.11 18.50
23 13 13 19.78 19.78
24 79 50 18.31 20.14
25 40 37 20.34 20.35
26 70 37 19.08 20.35
27 22 13 20.14 19.78
28 51 57 20.10 19.86
29 44 0 20.28 18.94
30 57 60 19.86 19.72
31 1 38 19.01 20.35
Mean 51.06 40.64 19.40 19.71



















































.4Figure 2: Histograms of absolute differences from 37  
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